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Abstract
Edge computing and distributed machine learning have advanced to a level that can revolutionize a
particular organization. Distributed devices such as the Internet of Things (IoT) often produce a large
amount of data, eventually resulting in big data that can be vital in uncovering hidden patterns, and
other insights in numerous fields such as healthcare, banking, and policing. Data related to areas such
as healthcare and banking can contain potentially sensitive data that can become public if they are
not appropriately sanitized. Federated learning (FedML) is a recently developed distributed machine
learning (DML) approach that tries to preserve privacy by bringing the learning of an ML model
to data owners’. However, literature shows different attack methods such as membership inference
that exploit the vulnerabilities of ML models as well as the coordinating servers to retrieve private
data. Hence, FedML needs additional measures to guarantee data privacy. Furthermore, big data
often requires more resources than available in a standard computer. This paper addresses these issues
by proposing a distributed perturbation algorithm named as DISTPAB, for privacy preservation of
horizontally partitioned data. DISTPAB alleviates computational bottlenecks by distributing the task
of privacy preservation utilizing the asymmetry of resources of a distributed environment, which can
have resource-constrained devices as well as high-performance computers. Experiments show that
DISTPAB provides high accuracy, high efficiency, high scalability, and high attack resistance. Further
experiments on privacy-preserving FedML show that DISTPAB is an excellent solution to stop privacy
leaks in DML while preserving high data utility.
Keywords: data privacy, distributed data privacy, privacy preserving machine learning,distributed
machine learning, federated learning
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1. Introduction
The amalgamation of different technologies such as edge computing, IoT, cloud computing, and ma-
chine learning has contributed to a rapid proliferation of technological development in many areas such
as healthcare and banking [1, 2, 3]. The increase of cheap pervasive sensing devices has contributed to
the rapid growth of IoT, becoming one of the main sources of big data [4]. In the broader spectrum of
sensor systems, cyber-physical systems and advanced analysis tools are converged together to provide
consolidated services. As a result, a particular system (e.g. healthcare, banking) can now be benefited
from multiple sources of data, additionally to what is accumulated by conventional means [5]. This
growing availability of different sources of data has been able to revolutionize leading fields such as
healthcare technologies to achieve excellent achievements in many areas such as drug discovery, early
outbreak detection, epidemic control analysis, which were once considered to be complicated [2, 3].
However, data related to the fields such as healthcare, banking and policing are massively convoluted
with sensitive private data [6, 7, 8]. It is essential to go for extreme measures to protect sensitive data
while analyzing them to generate meaningful insights [9, 10]. However, it is an extremely challenging
task as systems related to fields such as healthcare and banking are often densely distributed. This
paper examines the issues related to distributed data sharing and analysis in order to devise an opti-
mal privacy preservation solution towards distributed machine learning [11] in environments such as
presented in Figure 1, which represents a typical distributed industry setup (e.g. smart healthcare,
open banking) that runs on IoT, edge, fog, and cloud computing.
Privacy violations in fields such as healthcare and banking can be catastrophic due to the availabil-
ity of highly sensitive person-specific data [7]. Among different definitions, privacy for data sharing
and analysis can be defined as “Controlled Information Release” [12]. It has been shown before that
it is easy to identify patients in a database by combining several quasi-identifiers such as age, post-
code, and sex [13]. Removing just the identifiers from the dataset before releasing is not enough to
protect the individuals’ privacy, and leaking personal information to untrusted third parties can be
catastrophic [14, 15, 16, 17]. Privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) is the area that applies privacy-
preserving approaches to data mining methods to protect the private information of the users of the
underlying input data during the data mining processes [14]. In this paper, we investigate the PPDM
solutions that can be applied to limit privacy leaks in distributed machine learning (DML) under big
data settings. The area of homomorphic encryption is widely explored for PPDM. However, in terms
of big data and DML, homomorphic encryption cannot address the three challenges, (i) efficiency, (ii)
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high volume, and (iii) massive distribution of data. Furthermore, homomorphic encryption increases
the data size during the encryption ( e.g. single bit can be multiplied to 16 bits), which is unreliable
for big data and increases the data storage burdens [18]. Compared to encryption, data perturbation
(data modification) can provide efficient solutions towards privacy preservation with a predetermined
error that can result due to the data modification [19, 20].
Federated Learning (FedML) is a distributed machine approach that is developed to provide efficient
privacy-preserving machine learning in a distributed environment [21]. In FedML, the machine learning
model generation is done at the data owners’ computers, and a coordinating server (e.g. a cloud server)
is used to generate a global model and share the ML knowledge among the distributed entities (e.g. edge
devices). Since the original data never leave the data owners’ devices, FedML is assumed to provide
privacy to the raw data. However, ML models show vulnerability to privacy inference attacks such as
model memorizing attacks and membership inference, which focus on retrieving sensitive data from
trained ML models even under black-box settings [22, 23]. Model inversion attacks that recover images
from a facial recognition system [24] is another example that shows the vulnerability of ML to advanced
adversarial attacks. If adversaries gain access to the central server/coordinating server, they can deploy
attacks such as model memorizing attacks, which can memorize and extract raw data from the trained
models [22]. Hence, DML approaches, such as FedML, need additional measures to guarantee that
there will not be any unanticipated privacy leaks. Differential privacy is a privacy definition (privacy
model) that offers a strong notion of privacy compared to previous models [6]. Due to the application of
heavy noise, the previous attempt to enforce differential privacy on big data has resulted in low utility
in terms of advanced analytics, which can be catastrophic for applications such as healthcare [25]. A
major disadvantage of other techniques such as random rotation and geometric perturbation is their
incapability to process high dimensional data (big data) efficiently. These perturbation approaches
spend an excessive amount of time to generate better results with good utility and privacy [26, 27]. In
terms of efficiency, additive perturbation provides good performance. However, the perturbed data end
up with a low privacy guarantee [28]. Another issue that is often ignored when developing privacy-
preserving mechanisms for big data is data capacity issues. The application of privacy preservation
(the specific algorithms based on encryption on perturbation) on a large database can be extensive
and impossible if the exact resource allocation scenarios are not implemented correctly. A recently
developed algorithm named PABIDOT for big data privacy preservation promises to provide high
efficiency towards big data. The proposed method shows high classification accuracy for big data
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while providing high privacy. However, PABIDOT cannot be used for DML as it does not address the
data distribution and data perturbation using resource-constrained devices (as depicted in Figure 1).
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Figure 1: An example for a distributed organizational setting: a healthcare ecosystem which is geographically distributed
among multiple locations. A healthcare system may have many distributed branches to it, facilitating and collecting
many healthcare data including IoT sensor data. The central body coordinates the distributed hospitals in terms of
maintaining data integrity to support a wide range of analytics. The central authority/research centre is also responsible
for sharing data to cloud-based third parties for enhanced intelligence and quality of service towards their patients.
We propose a new DIStributed Privacy-preserving Approach for distributed machine learning in
geographically distributed data and systems (DISTPAB). DISTPAB is a distributed privacy-preserving
algorithm that employs a data perturbation mechanism. The distributed scenario of data perturbation
of DISTPAB allows the perturbation of extensive datasets that need to be shared among distributed
entities without leaking privacy. The actual data perturbation is conducted in the distributed entities
(in edge/fog devices) locally using the global perturbation parameters generated in a central coordinat-
ing node before conducting FedML. This way, DISTPAB restricts original data to be communicated
(before perturbation) via the network, which can be attacked by adversaries. The global perturbation
parameter generation of DISTPAB ensures that there is no degradation of accuracy or attack resis-
tance of the perturbed data. DISTPAB was first tested using six datasets obtained from the data
repository named ”UCI Machine Learning Repository”1. The results show that DISTPAB provides
excellent classification accuracy, attack resistance, and excellent efficiency towards distributed machine
learning under big data settings.
1http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/index.php
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The following sections of the paper are set out as follows. Section 2 includes a summary of related
work. Section 3 provides a summary of the fundamentals used in developing DISTPAB. Section 4
provides background information related to DISTPAB. Section 5 presents the experimental evaluations
of the the performance and the attack resistance of DISTPAB. Section 6 provides a discussion on the
results provided in Section 5. The paper is concluded in Section 7.
2. Literature Review
Distributed systems such as available in healthcare have become vastly complex due to the amal-
gamation of different technologies such as IoT, edge computing, and cloud computing. Due to these
advanced capabilities, a modern system can utilize a myriad of data sources to facilitate improved
capabilities towards essential services. The nature of distributed data platforms introduces a plethora
of complexities towards preserving user privacy of users without compromising data utility. Extremely
high dimensions and massive distribution of data sources are two of the main complexities that need
to be addressed when designing robust privacy-preserving approaches for DML systems. Due to these
reasons, privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) approaches should be efficient and should be able to
work in distributed settings. Approaches based on secure multi-party computation [29], attribute access
control [4], lightweight cryptographic procedures [18], homomorphic encryption [18] are few exam-
ples for some encryption approach which can provide good privacy. However, the high computational
complexity of such encryption scenarios can seriously jeopardize the performance of a distributed ML
setup. The inherent high computational complexity of the cryptographic approaches requires excessive
amounts of computational resources, which include large storage facilities such as cloud computing that
are often controlled by third-parties. Furthermore, the encryption approaches such as homomorphic
encryption for PPDM increase the size of the data after the application of encryption, which is not suit-
able for the domain of big data as the data sizes can already be extensive. Hence, the implementation of
cryptographic scenarios for distributed databases can be unrealistic and unaffordable [25]. Compared
to encryption, data perturbation/modification provides efficient and lightweight solutions for big data
privacy [28], and hence, data perturbation is a better fitting solution for PPDM of distributed data.
Previous data perturbation approaches include swapping [30], additive perturbation [31], conden-
sation [32], randomized response [33], microaggregation [34], random rotation [26], random projection
[35], geometric perturbation [27], and hybrid perturbation [36]. Due to the modifications, the data
end up with reduced utility. The relationship between utility and privacy granted by a particular
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perturbation algorithm is defined via a privacy model [37]. More than a few privacy models have
been introduced where one model tries to overcome the defects of another. k − anonymity [38, 39],
l − diversity [40], t − closeness [41], (α, k) − anonymity [42], kθ − affinity [43] are some exam-
ples for privacy models. However, these models exhibit vulnerabilities to attacks such as composition
attacks [44], minimality attacks [45], and foreground knowledge [46] attacks. Moreover, the pertur-
bation approaches that use these models do not scale for big data with high dimensions. When the
dimensions of the input dataset grow, the computational cost necessary to conduct data perturbation
grows exponentially. The literature refers to this phenomenon as ”The Dimensionality Curse” [47].
Another issue in high dimensional data is the leak of extra information that can be effectively used
by attackers to misuse sensitive private information [48]. Differential privacy (DP) is another privacy
model, which was developed more recently to render a strong privacy guarantee compared to prior
approaches. Nevertheless, due to the high noise levels imposed by DP algorithms, DP might not be
the optimal choice for big data privacy [25].
The distribution of data sources and infrastructures also introduces a massive complexity to-
wards the development of robust privacy-preserving approaches for distributed databases. Modern
distributed privacy-preserving approaches include federated (FedNN) machine learning and split learn-
ing (SplitNN), which can provide a certain level of privacy to distributed databases. In FedML, the
distributed clients use their local data to train local ML models and communicate the locally trained
ML model parameters with the central server to train a global representation of the local models.
The server then distributes the global model parameters with the clients so that the clients can now
generalize their local models based on the model parameters federated by the server. SplitML has a
similar distributed setup. However, instead of communicating the model parameters, SplitML splits
the ML model between the clients and the server. During the training process, a client will hold a
portion of the ML model, whereas the server will hold the other portion of the ML model. As a
result, a client will transfer activations from its split layer to the split layer of the server during both
forward and backward passes of the training process of the ML model. When many clients need to
connect to the server for ML model training, the clients will either have a peer to peer communication
or a client-server communication for the model parameter communications in order for each client to
have a synchronous ML model training process. However, both FedML and SplitML have the same
problem of the central point of failure as the server in both cases has too much control over the model
learning process. If the server is attacked, the whole framework becomes vulnerable, and as a result,
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user privacy cannot be guaranteed. Especially the attack methods such as membership inference and
model memorization can exploit the vulnerabilities of the central point of failure to retrieve raw data
used for the model training process. The other distributed approaches which work on horizontally and
vertically partitioned data also tend to produce issues towards efficiency or privacy [49]. As most of
these methods use the approaches based on homomorphic encryption to provide privacy, such methods
become inefficient when working with big data, and the need to share too much information with the
server makes most of them untrusted and yields the same issue of the central point of failure [49].
Among data perturbation approaches, matrix multiplicative approaches proved to provide high
utility towards data clustering and classification [14]. Examples for matrix multiplicative perturba-
tion approaches include random rotation, geometric, and projection perturbation [28] methods. For
example, random rotation perturbation repeatedly multiplies the input data by a randomly generated
matrix with the properties of an orthogonal matrix, until the perturbed data satisfy a pre-anticipated
level of privacy [26]. An additional matrix of translation and distance perturbation are combined
with random rotation to produce geometric data perturbation. The added randomness of the random
translation matrix improves the privacy of the perturbed data. However, geometric data perturba-
tion also follows the same repeated approach until the perturbed data satisfy an expected level of
privacy [27]. Random projection perturbation follows a different approach by projecting the high di-
mensional input data to a low dimensional space [35]. One of the important properties of matrix
multiplicative data perturbation approaches is their ability to preserve the distance between tuples of
the input dataset [26, 27, 35]. As a result of this property, matrix multiplicative approaches provide
high utility for data classification and clustering, which are based on distance calculations. However,
due to the inefficient approaches utilized for the optimal perturbation parameter generation, rotation
perturbation, geometric perturbation, and projection fail to provide enough scalability. PABIDOT
is a recently developed perturbation approach for the privacy preservation of big data classification,
using the properties of geometric data perturbations. PABIDOT provides high efficiency towards big
data while maintaining high privacy and classification accuracy. However, for distributed healthcare
scenarios such as shown in Figure 1, PABIDOT cannot be applied as it is not a distributed algorithm.
As shown in Figure 1, a distributed system can be composed of branches that are geographically dis-
persed. The data coming from each branch should be perturbed before they leave the local network. A
distributed data perturbation algorithm which can provide high utility while maintaining high privacy
for distributed healthcare is essential.
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3. Fundamentals
The proposed method uses multidimensional transformations and Randomized Expansion [14],
which improves the randomness of the data. DISTPAB considers the input dataset as a data matrix
in which each tuple is regarded as a column vector for applying the transformations. This section
explains how the data transformation is for perturbation and how the randomization of the final
output is improved using Randomized Expansion.
3.1. Data matrix (D)
We consider the input dataset as a data matrix. The row vectors represent the data records
of the input dataset. Each row vector will be subjected to multidimensional transformations on an
n-dimensional Cartesian coordinate (n = number of attributes) system.
3.2. Multidimensional isometric transformations
If a multidimensional transformation, T : Rn → Rn holds Equation 1. Reflection, translation and
rotation are examples for multidimensional isometric transformation [50].
|T (A)− T (B)| = |A−B|, ∀ A,B ∈ Rn (1)
3.3. Homogeneous coordinate form and composite operations
In n− dimensional space, we can write a homogeneous coordinate point as an (n+1) dimensional
position vector (x1, x2, . . . , xn, h), where h 6= 0 is an additional term.
An (n + 1) dimensional position vector (x1, x2, . . . , xn, h), represents a homogeneous coordinate
point in the n− dimensional space when h 6= 0 is an additional term. This coordinate form allows
representing all transformations in matrix multiplication form of size of (n+ 1)× (n+ 1) [51].
A transformation operation is called a composite transformation when it involves the operations
between several matrices. Equation 2 shows the composite transformation of the sequential application
of M1,M2,M3, . . . to a homogeneous matrix X.
X ′ = . . . (M3(M2(M1X))) = . . .M3 ×M2 ×M1 ×X (2)
We can use a new column of ones, where h = 1, to convert a data matrix into its homogeneous
matrix form [14].
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3.4. z-score normalization of the input dataset, D
The attributes of an input dataset can have different scales, which requires different levels of
perturbation to each attribute. Consequently, applying the same levels of perturbation would not
provide equal protection to all the attributes. As a result, the final version of the perturbed dataset will
have attributes with insufficient levels of perturbation. We apply z-score normalization (also referred
to as standardization) to impose equal weights to all the attributes during the transformations. The
z-score normalization scales the input dataset with a standard deviation equals to 1 and a mean equals
to 0 [52].
3.5. Generating transformation matrices for perturbation
For the perturbation of the input data matrix, we need to generate the n-dimensional homogeneous
translation, reflection, and rotation matrices. We can generate the translational matrix according to
[51] (refer Appendix .1). Since the input data matrix is z-score normalized, the translational coefficients
of the translational matrix are sampled from a uniform random distribution that lies in the interval
(0, 1) [14]. We can generate the (n+1) axis reflection matrix utilizing n-dimensional reflection matrix
(refer to Appendix .2) [14]. The rotational matrix can be generated using the concept of concatenated
subplane rotation (refer Appendix .3) [14].
3.6. Randomized expansion
Randomized expansion is a noise addition approach which improves the randomness of the per-
turbed data [14]. Equation 3 shows the randomized expansion noise generation where S± is the sign
matrix generated based on the values of Dp2 (intermediate perturbed data matrix). As the equation
shows, the positiveness or the negativeness is improved by randomized expansion to provide high utility
with improved randomization [14].
Dp2 = (
∥∥Dp2∥∥+ ‖N (0, σ)‖) • S± (3)
3.7. Quantification of privacy
V ar(D − Dp) is one approach to measure the level of privacy of the perturbed data, where D is
original data and Dp is perturbed data [31]. The higher the V ar(P ), the higher the difficulty, hence
the higher the privacy. Take Xp to be a perturbed data series of attribute X. Now, V ar(P ) can be
written as in Equation 4, where P = (Xp −X).
9
V ar(P ) = V ar(p1, p2, . . . , pn) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(pi − p¯)2 (4)
3.8. Φ− separation
Φ− separation is a privacy model that allows the selection of optimal perturbation parameters for
a perturbation algorithm in a given instance of data. Φ− separation allows the determination of the
best perturbation parameters while providing an optimal empirical privacy guarantee [14].
Definition 1 (Φ−separation). Apply a perturbation algorithm M to the dataset D = [d1, d2, . . . , dn]m×n
to generate the perturbed instances of D as Dpj = [d
p
j1, d
p
j2, . . . , d
p
jn]m×n for j = 1, 2, . . . , k. If k repre-
sents the number of all feasible ways to apply M to D to generation Dp. Then,
φj = min{[var(di − dpji)]}∀j = 1, 2, . . . , k (5)
where φj is the minimum privacy guarantee.
We can maximize all the possible minimum privacy guarantees (φj) to obtain the optimal privacy
guarantee Φ as
Φ = max{φj}kj=1 (6)
A perturbed dataset provides Φ− separation if it satisfies Equation 6.
3.9. Federated Learning
Federated learning provides the capability to train a machine learning model using distributed data
without sharing the original data between the participating entities. Assume that {D1, . . . DN} are
distributed datasets, which are distributed among N data owners {O1, . . . ON}. In a federated learning
setup, each of these datasets (Di) never have to leave the corresponding owner (Oi) and each owner
trains ML models locally without exposing the corresponding data to any external parties. The model
parameters of the locally trained models are then collected in a server (a central entity/authority),
which federate the parameters to generate a global representation of all the models (MLfed). The
accuracy (Afed) of MLfed should be very close to the accuracy (Actr) of the model trained centrally
with all the data [21]. This relationship can be represented using Eq. 7, where δ is a non-negative
real number.
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|Afed −Actr| < δ (7)
3.9.1. Horizontal and vertical federated learning
In horizontal federated learning, all the clients share the same feature space but different space in
samples. Consider a feature space X : x1, . . . , xn, a sample ID space of I : i1, . . . , ij , and a label space of
Y : y1, . . . , yk constitutes the complete training dataset (I,X, Y ). Then a particular distributed client
will have the dataset (il, X, Y ). Several regional banks, with different user groups with similar business
characteristics having the same feature spaces, can be an example of a horizontally partitioned scenario.
In vertical federated learning, all the clients share the same sample ID (I) space and different feature
spaces (x1, . . . , xn). Then a particular distributed client will have the dataset (I, xl, Y ). Different
companies with different businesses having different feature spaces and the same user group, is an
example of a vertically partitioned scenario. In this work, we consider only the horizontal federated
learning scenario.
In the next section, we provide a detailed description of how these fundamentals are used in
developing the proposed approach (DISTPAB) for distributed machine learning.
4. Our Approach: DISTPAB
This section explains the steps of developing a distributed data perturbation algorithm (named as
DISTPAB) for a distributed data and machine learning. Figure 2 shows the application of privacy
to a distributed healthcare ecosystem shown in Figure 1. As shown in the figure, the main goal of
DISTPAB is to shift the perturbation to the distributed branches before the data leave the local edge
and fog layer. However, in doing so, the algorithm should not lose global utility. To achieve that, the
main branch (the research center) and the distributed branches will conduct a perturbation parameter
exchange. As the perturbation is done using the globally optimal parameters, DISTPAB can maintain
a proper balance between utility and privacy. During our explanations, we will be using the words
node and entity alternatively, representing the same concept. However, more specifically, we consider
an entity to be a fully populated institute, whereas a node to be one or more computing/processing
devices within an entity.
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Figure 2: An example scenario where DISTPAB is integrated to a distributed healthcare system to preserve the privacy
of data. The lowest layer represents the distributed set of entities (hospitals) and their interaction with DISTPAB
within the fog and edge bounds. As the figure shows, the distributed components of DISTPAB are integrated into each
of the distributed hospitals for performing the data perturbations. The central controlling entity (research centre) will
be communicating with the cloud layer, which supports third-party analytical services. In this setup, we assume that
no party saves original IoT data, and will only save the perturbed data.
The proposed algorithm delegates data maintenance and perturbation to the distributed entities,
leaving only the global perturbation parameter generation to the central entity. Figure 3 shows the
distributed architecture of DISTPAB, which can be used for the perturbation of healthcare data. In this
way, the distributed branches do not have to share the original data with any untrusted third party.
However, due to the coordination of the proposed algorithm in generating the global perturbation
parameters, the perturbed data can provide high utility.
4.1. Centralized perturbation paradigm
DISTPAB first applies geometric transformations in the order of (1) reflection, (2) translation,
and (3) rotation to an input dataset. Next, DISTPAB performs randomized expansion and random
tuple shuffling to enhance the randomness of the perturbed data [14]. The perturbation is repeated
until the perturbed dataset satisfies Φ − separation. In order to devise the distributed paradigm in
DISTPAB, we discuss the centralized approach, which is given in Algorithm 1. Algorithm 1 takes only
two inputs: (1) the original dataset, (2) the standard deviation of the normal random noise generated
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for randomized expansion.
Before applying the composite geometric transformations, the algorithm derives the best pertur-
bation parameters using the z-score normalized input data matrix. However, obtaining the best
perturbation parameters at Φ for a big dataset can be extremely inefficient, as it involves running
Dp1 = (Mi×TNnoise×RFax× (DN )T )T and φi,ax = min(V ar(xij − pij)mi=1)nj=1 ∀ xij ∈ DN for mul-
tiple perturbation instances (under the loops in Step 7 and 9 of Algorithm 1 ) of the original datasets.
We can prove that these two steps are equal to φi,ax = min(~1 + diag(Mi × RFax × CDN × RFax ×
MTi ) + sum((CD
N × RFax •Mi)T )T ) [14] which is much simpler in time complexity as it uses the
corresponding covariance matrix to determine the best perturbation parameters instead of browsing
through the whole dataset in each iteration.
The algorithm maximizes the φ value in each iteration until it obtains Φ as given in Equation 10.
The number of perturbed instances of D can be given as, Dp1,1, D
p
1,2, . . . , D
p
1,179, D
p
2,1, D
p
2,2,
. . . , Dp2,179, . . . , D
p
n,1, D
p
n,2, . . . , D
p
n,179 where n represents the number of attributes, consequently, the
axis of reflection varies from 1 to n. 0 < θ < pi, where θ /∈ {pi/6, pi/4, pi/3, pi/2, 2pi/3, 3pi/4, 5pi/6}.
This will result in a matrix of φ values (local minimum privacy guarantees) as represented in Equation
8.

φ1,1 φ1,2 φ1,3 . . . φ1,179
φ2,1 φ2,2 φ2,3 . . . φ2,179
...
...
...
. . .
...
φn,1 φn,2 φn,3 . . . φn,179

n×179
(8)
As given in Equation 9, we obtain the minimum value from each column of Equation 8 to identify the
best φj for each instance of θ.
[
φ1 φ2 φ3 . . . φ179
]
(9)
Now we choose Φ, as the largest of global minimum privacy guarantees (φj) as represented in
Equation 10. This can also be explained as finding the highest privacy guarantee Φ that can be
rendered by the most vulnerable attribute in the database.
Φ = max([[φj ]
179
j=1]) (10)
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After determining the best perturbation parameters, the geometric transformations are conducted
on the normalized input dataset following the order of reflection, noise translation, and rotation. We
follow this order of transformations to avoid the points (in the n-dimensional space) closer to the
origin, getting lower levels of perturbation. Rotation has a larger effect on the points that are far
away from the origin compared to those which are close to the origin. As a result, the points which
are close to the origin can get easily attacked. Equation 11 shows the order of the application of the
three transformations on the normalized input data matrix, where rotation is conducted as the last
transformation for the highest perturbation possible. As the next step, we add noise using randomized
expansion. Reverse z-score normalization on the perturbed data is used to generate an output in the
attribute ranges similar to the original dataset. Next, the tuples are randomly swapped in order to
limit vulnerability to data linkage attacks.
Dp = (M × TND ×RFND × (DN )T )T (11)
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Algorithm 1: Centralized perturbation algorithm
Input:
D ← original dataset
σ ← input noise standard deviation
(default value=0.3)
Output: Dp ← perturbed dataset
1 Φ = 0;
2 θoptimal = 0 ;
3 Rifoptimal = 0 ;
4 generate DN ;
5 generate Cov(DN );
6 generate TNnoise;
7 for each ax in {1, 2, . . . , n} do
8 generate RFax ;
9 for each θi do
10 generate Mi using Algorithm 4;
11 φi,ax = min(~1 + diag(Mi×RFax× Cov(DN )×RFax×MTi ) + sum((Cov(DN )×RFax •Mi)T )T )
12 for each θi do
13 φi = min(φi,ax) where, ax ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n};
14 Φ = max(φi) where, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , θ};
15 θoptimal = θi at Φ;
16 Rifoptimal = ax at Φ;
17 generate Mθ ;
18 generate RFoptimal ;
19 Dpt = (Mθ × TNnoise ×RFoptimal × (DN )T )T ;
20 Dpt = (‖Dpt‖+ ‖N (0, σ)‖)•S± ;
21 Dp= Dpt • STDV EC+MEANV EC;
22 randomly swap the tuples of Dp ;
4.2. Distributing the perturbation
In order to distribute the perturbation among distributed entities, we break the steps of Algorithm
1 into two main phases, as shown in Figure 3. (1) Generate the global perturbation parameters using
the local properties forwarded to the central entity (research centre). (2) Conduct perturbation of data
at the distributed entities using the global parameters. (3) Conduct machine learning on perturbed
data. In order to achieve these three goals, first, the variance-covariance matrix of each partition of the
dataset is passed to the central node, which will run Algorithm 3. Assume that there are k distributed
branches which have the data partitions D1, D2, . . . , Dk. Take D to be the dataset created by merging
all the k datasets, as given in Equation 12.
15
D = merge(D1, D2, . . . , Dk) (12)
Central Authority
DE 1 DE 2 DE 3 DE k
PM1 PM2 PM3 PMk
Global Settings
PM1+PM2+PM3+PMk
PHASE 1
parameters from DE to CA
Distributed Entity (DE)
Central Entity
PHASE 2
parameters from CA to DE
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Federated Learning
Figure 3: Distributed architecture of the perturbation algorithm. The figure shows the abstract view of the distributed
perturbation scenario over distributed machine learning. There can be k number of distributed branches that are
communicating with the central entity (coordinating server). There are two phases of parameter communication. Phase
1 involves the distributed branches sending local parameters sending to the central entity, whereas Phase 2 involves the
central node sending the optimal perturbation parameters (which are calculated based on the local parameters which
were sent by the distributed branches) to the distributed branches for perturbation.
To merge the covariance matrices, the pairwise covariance update formula introduced in [53] is
adapted. The pairwise covariance update formula for the two merged two column (u and v) data
partitions, A and B, can be written as shown in Equation 13 where the merged dataset is denoted as
X.
Cov(X) =
CA
(mA−1) +
CB
(mB−1) + (µu,A − µu,B)(µv,A − µv,B).mA.mBmX
(mX − 1) (13)
where µu,A, µu,A, µv,A, µv,B are means of u and v of the two data partitions A and B respectively.
CA and CB are the co-moments of the two data partitions A and B where the co-moment of a two
column (u and v) dataset D is represented as
CD =
∑
(u,v)∈D
(u− µu)(v − µv) (14)
Therefore, the variance-covariance matrix update formula of the two data partitions D1 and D2
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can be written as shown in Equation 15.
Cov(Dnew) =
Cov(D1)
(mD1−1) +
Cov(D2)
(mD2−1) + (µD1(MI1)− µD2(MI1))(µD1(MI2)− µD2(MI2)).
mD1 .mD2
mDnew
(mDnew − 1)
(15)
where Cov(Dnew), Cov(D1), Cov(D2) are the covariance matrices of the merged dataset Dnew
and the data partitions D1 and D2 respectively. µD1 and µD2 are mean vectors of D1 and D2
respectively and
MI1 =

[1]n
[2]n
[3]n
...
[n]n

n×n
(16)
MI2 = (MI1)
T (17)
After generating the covariance matrix (Cov(D)) based on the global parameters (refer Equation
18), we can produce the vector of standard deviations (STDV EC =
√
diag(Cov(D))) based on the
diagonal vector of Cov(D). We can generate the vector of means (MEANV EC) using Equation 19
where yi = Mean(Di).
Cov(D) =

V ar1 Cov1,2 . . . Cov1,n
Cov2,1 V ar2 . . . Cov2,n
...
...
. . .
...
Covn,1 Covn,2 . . . V arn

n×n
(18)
MEANV EC =
m1 × y1 +m2 × y2 + . . .+mk × yk
m1+,m2 + . . .+mk
(19)
Each distributed branch needs to generate the covariance matrix (Cov(partitioni)) and the mean
vector (Mean(partitioni)) of the corresponding data partition and pass it to the central entity for the
execution of Algorithm 3. After completing the execution of Algorithm 3, the central node will pass
the required parameters to the distributed entities according to Algorithm 2, as shown in Figure 3.
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Table 1 shows the parameter exchange between the central entity and the distributed entities during
the perturbation process.
Table 1: Data (parameter values) passed between the central entity and the distributed entities in the two phases of
communications. As shown in Figure 3, in phase 1, the distributed entities send the local perturbation parameters to the
central entity. In phase2, the central entity sends the global parameters (which are calculated using the local parameters)
to the distributed entities.
Phase 1: from distributed
nodes to central node
(Local parameters related to
each data partition)
Phase 2: from centralized node
to distributed nodes
Global parameters related to
all the partitions
1. covariance matrix 1. random reflection matrix
2. vector of means 2. random translation matrix
3. Number of attributes
3. random rotation matrix
4. standard deviation for randomized
expansion
4.3. Workload of a distributed entity
Algorithm 2 shows the workload of a distributed node (hospital) where the actual data perturbation
is conducted. As the algorithm shows, the data will not be transmitted to the central entity as
part of the perturbation process. First, the local parameters which are determined based on the
local dataset will be sent to the central node. Next, the global parameters which are calculated and
sent to the distributed entities will be used for the perturbation of the local dataset. However, the
step of randomized expansion (refer step 7 of Algorithm 2) doesn’t involve any interactions with the
central node as randomized expansion needs to evaluate the noise based on each individual instance.
Consequently, in the distributed setting, randomized expansion increases the randomization of the
perturbed data over the centralized approach.
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Algorithm 2: Task of a distributed entity
Input:
Di, Mθ, TN
noise, RFoptimal, STDV EC,
MEANV EC
Output: Dpi ← perturbed data partition
1 generate DNi ;
2 generate Cov(DNi );
3 generate Mean(DNi );
4 send Phase 1 data to the central entity;
5 receive Phase 2 data from the central entity;
6 Dpti = (Mθ × TNnoise ×RFoptimal × (DNi )T )T ;
7 Dpti = D
pt
i +N (0, min(σDpti ));
8 Dpi = D
pt
i • STDV EC+MEANV EC;
9 randomly swap the tuples of Dpi ;
4.4. Workload of the central node
Algorithm 3 shows the workload of the central entity. As shown in the algorithm, the central entity
calculates the global perturbation parameters that need to be transmitted to the distributed entities.
We assume that the distributed nodes are selected through a prior handshake mechanism that confirms
the validity and reliability of the distributed nodes. However, since the proposed algorithm does not
share the original data with any party before the perturbation, there will not be any privacy leak
during the communication of the parameters.
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Algorithm 3: Task of the central entity
Input:
Cov(D1), Cov(D2), ..., Cov(Dk)← Covariance
matrices of the data partitions
Mean(D1),Mean(D2), ...,Mean(Dk)← Mean
vectors of the data partitions
Output:
Mθ, TNnoise, RFoptimal, STDV EC,
MEANV EC
1 receive Phase 1 data from the distributed entiteis;
2 Φ = 0;
3 θoptimal = 0;
4 generate TNnoise;
5 Cov(Dt) = Cov(D1);
6 for each covariance matrix, Cov(Di) do
7 if i < k then
8 Cov(Do) = Cov(Di+1);
9 Cov(Dnew) = merge(Cov(Dt), Cov(Do)), according to Equation 15;
10 Cov(Dt) = Cov(Dnew);
11 Cov(D) = Cov(Dnew);
12 STDV EC =
√
diag(Cov(D));
13 MEANV EC = combine(Mean(D1),Mean(D2), ...,Mean(Dk)), using,
MEANV EC = m1×y1+m2×y2+...+mk×ykm1+,2+...+mk ,
14 where, yi = Mean(Di);
15 for each ax in {1, 2, . . . , n} do
16 generate RFax ;
17 for each θi do
18 generate Mi using Algorithm 4;
19 φi,ax = min(~1 + diag(Mi×RFax× Cov(DN )×RFax×MTi ) + sum((Cov(DN )×RFax •Mi)T )T )
20 for each θi do
21 φi = min(φi,ax) where, ax ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} ;
22 Φ = max(φi) where, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , θ};
23 θoptimal = θi at Φ;
24 Rifoptimal = ax at Φ;
25 generate Mθ ;
26 generate RFoptimal ;
27 send Phase 2 data to the distributed entities;
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4.5. Federated learning over perturbed data
As shown in Figure 3, the federated module comes into action after the perturbation is completed
(in the first two phases). Each of the distributed entities will use the local data (perturbed) to train
a local ML model (e.g. deep neural network) for a certain number of local epochs. After finishing
the local epochs, the distributed entities will send the model parameters to the central repository to
generate a global representation of the model by aggregating the model parameters (refer to section
3.9). The server (central authority) then passes the aggregated parameters back to the distributed
entities to update the local models to generalize the models. This is called one round of federation.
The federated learning setup will conduct a sufficient number of local epochs and federation rounds to
train the ML models based on the requirements of the organization (e.g. production of data streams
or big data), ML model architecture, and the properties of the input dataset.
5. Results
This section provides the experimental results of the performance of DISTPAB. We tested DIST-
PAB on six datasets to compare and evaluate its performance against three algorithms: RP (rotation
perturbation), GP (geometric perturbation), and PABIDOT. We considered 0.3 as the default value
of σ for the experiments unless specified otherwise. Next, we measured the performance of DISTPAB
on FedML to examine the utility loss due to the perturbation. More details on the FedML setup is
provided in section 5.4.1. For the experiments, we used a Windows 7 (Enterprise 64-bit, Build 7601)
computer with an Intel(R) i7-4790 (4th generation) CPU (8 cores, 3.60 GHz) and 8GB RAM. We
declared a virtual distributed environment (refer Section 5.1) to run DISTPAB under the computer
settings mentioned above. Table 2 has a summary of the datasets used for the experiments. We
selected the datasets by considering a diverse range of domains. We first perturbed the data using
RP, GP, PABIDOT, and DISTPAB. Next, we used the perturbed data to evaluate and compare the
attack resistance and the classification accuracy of RP, GP, PABIDOT, and DISTPAB. For classifica-
tion accuracy analysis, we used Weka 3.6 [54], which is a data mining tool that packages a collection
of data mining algorithms. We used the following classification algorithms: Naive Bayes, k-nearest
neighbor (kNN), Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO), Multilayer perceptron (MLP), and J48 [54]
to investigate the utility of the perturbed data.
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Table 2: Information about the generic datasets used for the experiments. We selected the data based on varying
dimensions from small to large in order to test the behavior of DISTPAB on different dynamics of the input data
dimensions.
Dataset Abbreviation Number of Records Number of Attributes Number of Classes
Wholesale customers2 WCDS 440 8 2
Wine Quality3 WQDS 4898 12 7
Page Blocks Classification 4 PBDS 5473 11 5
Letter Recognition5 LRDS 20000 17 26
Statlog (Shuttle)6 SSDS 58000 9 7
HEPMASS7 HPDS 3310816 28 2
5.1. Distributed computing setup
To test DISTPAB in a distributed setting, we used the “parpool” function in MATLAB [55].
“parpool(N)” creates N number of parallel processors (named as parallel workers) which can perform
distributed computing. For performance testing and comparison, we distributed an input dataset
among four workers by equally dividing the input dataset.
5.2. Time Complexity
We used both theoretical and runtime analysis to evaluate the computational complexity of DIST-
PAB. First, we conducted theoretical evaluations of the computational complexity of DISTPAB. Next,
we conducted runtime analyses to provide empirical evidence on the estimated time complexities. The
section from line 15 to line 19 (in Algorithm 1) has two loops that have a significant effect on the
computational complexity of Algorithm 1 as one is constrained by the number of attributes whereas
the other is controlled by the range of rotation angle. We can estimate that the runtime complexity of
the corresponding loops is O(k×n) = O(n) (n = the number of attributes, m = the number of tuples,
and k is a constant for the constant range of angle). We can estimate that step 11 (of Algorithm 1)
is O(n3). The loop segment (starts from step 7 to 11) contributes a O(n4) complexity. In can also be
estimated that step 19 introduces the highest computational complexity of O(n3 ×m) as m >>> n.
In terms of worst-case computational complexity, we can state that Algorithm 1 has a computational
complexity O(n3 ×m) when m >>> n. The steps 7 to 11 of Algorithm 1 are moved to Algorithm 3
which runs on the central node, and step 19 of Algorithm 1 is moved Algorithm 2 which runs on the
2https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Wholesale+customers
3https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Wine+Quality
4https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Page+Blocks+Classification
5https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Letter+Recognition
6https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Statlog+%28Shuttle%29
7https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/HEPMASS#
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distributed nodes. Consequently, the central node will have a computational complexity of O(n4). The
distributed nodes will have a computational complexity of O(n3 ×m). However, the communication
delay can increase the data perturbation time in a distributed setting.
Figures 4 and 5 show the empirical trends of time consumption by the central node and the
distributed nodes in perturbing the LRDS dataset. During the time calculations, we considered only
the time consumed for the perturbations by the corresponding processing unit (central or distributed)
to get an absolute understanding of time consumption. We ignored all the other factors, such as
communication delays and I/O operation delays. For this experiment, we considered four distributed
nodes communicating with the central node (refer Section 5.1). We used the LRDS dataset for the
analysis. During the study on how the time consumption is affected by the number of attributes,
we distributed the LRDS dataset equally among the distributed nodes (each processing 5000 tuples).
Next, we evaluated the effect of the number of distributed nodes on the classification accuracy and
attack resistance by gradually increasing the number of distributed nodes from 1 to 20. For this
experiment also, we used the LRDS dataset, and for each case, the dataset was distributed equally
among the distributed nodes.
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(a) The time consumption by the central entity for per-
turbation against the number of attributes. The plot con-
firms the theoretical evaluation of the central entity’s time
complexity, which is O(n4), where n is the number of at-
tributes.
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(b) The time consumption by the central entity for pertur-
bation against the number of tuples. The plot confirms the
theoretical evaluation of the central entity’s time complex-
ity, which is O(n4) = O(k) as n is constant. The central
node consumes a constant amount of time when n (the
number of attributes) is constant.
Figure 4: Time consumption by the central entity. The plots do not include communication delays, and they show the
time consumption for the perturbation of the LRDS dataset.
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(b) The average runtime consumption of the distributed
nodes for the perturbation against the number of in-
stances. The plot confirms the theoretical evaluation of
the time complexity, which is O(m), where m is the num-
ber of tuples.
Figure 5: Average time consumption by the central entity (for 4 nodes, refer Section 5.1 for the specifications of the
distributed setup). The plots do not include communication delays, and they show the time consumption for the
perturbation of the LRDS dataset.
5.3. Impact of communication delay on distributed data perturbation by DISTPAB
In this section, we try to investigate the impact of communication delay on data perturbation. For
this analysis, we use a large enough portion (240550×28) of the HPDS dataset to obtain a significant
enough trend while avoiding extensive time consumption. Figure 6a shows the time consumption of the
DISTPAB and the centralized version for an increasing number of attributes (the number of instances
is kept constant). Figure 6b shows the time consumption of DISTPAB for an increasing number of
instances (while the number of attributes is kept constant). In both cases, DISTPAB consumes more
time than the centralized version due to communication delays.
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(a) Time consumption of the centralized version and
DISTPAB against the number of attributes. Both algo-
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of attributes.
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(b) Time consumption of the centralized algorithm and
DISTPAB against the number of tuples.The plots confirm
the linear complexity of both versions for the number of
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Figure 6: Impact of communication delay over distributed perturbation in DISTPAB. In a real-world scenario, network
communication can be influenced by many factors, such as network latency and network congestion. It is complex to get
an exact estimation over the communication delays. As the figures show, DISTPAB follows the expected time complexity
(as available in the plot for the centralized algorithm) while adding the communication delays to its patterns.
5.4. Classification Accuracy
Although the perturbation is distributed, DISTPAB always generates optimal global perturbation
parameters similar to the perturbation parameter generation of the centralized algorithm (Algorithm
1). However, the randomized expansion step is carried out by each distributed entity separately to
improve the randomness of data. Consequently, the distributed version produces data with slightly
higher randomization than its centralized version. This feature also reduces the utility of the data
produced by the distributed version compared to the centralized version. Figure 7 shows the box plots
of average accuracies produced by each of the algorithms against the five classification algorithms. The
classification accuracy was generated using 10-fold cross-validation. As shown in the figure, DISTPAB
and PABIDOT produce similar classification accuracies. The figure also shows that both DISTPAB
and PABIDOT outperform RP and GP.
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Figure 7: Classification Accuracy. The figure shows the variation of the classification accuracy produced by the original
dataset and the datasets perturbed by the four perturbation approaches.
5.4.1. Federated learning setup
We simulated the federated learning setup using the Python socket programming interface and the
thread interface. In the default configuration, we considered 4 distributed clients. Each client trained
a fully connected neural network; activation=‘relu’, batch size=64, hidden layer sizes=(10, 200, 200),
final layer size = num of classes, final layer activation = ’softmax’, shuffle=True, optimizer=‘SGD’,
learning rate=‘constant’, learning rate init=0.0001, momentum=0.5, verbose=True. The models were
trained for 20 federation rounds, while each model was locally trained for 3 epochs. For this experiment,
we used the SSDS dataset that has a sufficient number of tuples to see a noticeable impact on the
performance while making a low burden on the computer resources (mentioned at the beginning of
section 5). We used a train/test split of 75%/25% during the experiments.
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Figure 8: Classification accuracy during federated learning. The plots show the performance of federated learning on
DISTPAB perturbed data under different numbers of distributed clients. The higher the number of clients, the higher
the amount of time taken for ML model convergence.
Fig 8 shows the performance of the federated model using data perturbed by DISTPAB. The
figure shows the performance against different number of distributed branches (clients). During the
experiment, the input dataset was equally divided between distributed entities. Consequently, the
higher the number of clients, the lower the number of tuples in each client. Thus, the model needs more
federation rounds for convergence when the number of clients is higher. We can also notice that there is
a sudden drop in accuracy in the second round, and the accuracy increases as the federation continues.
This is due to the extensive parameter modification that takes place during the second round. The
higher the number of clients, the more significant the effect that results in a more substantial drop in
the accuracy.
5.5. Attack Resistance
We investigated the attack resistance of DISTPAB against Known I/O (IO) attacks, naive inference
(NI), and Independent Component Analysis (ICA) [28] which are considered to be three potential
attacks on matrix multiplicative approaches. We considered the default values of ten iterations and
a sigma (noise factor) of 0.3 for the experiments on GP and RP. We obtained std(D − Dp)) (std
represents the standard deviation, D the input data matrix, Dp represents the perturbed data of D),
which provides an estimate to the resistance against NI. Next, we applied ICA and IO on the perturbed
data to generate reconstructed data. We assumed that 10% of the original data as the background
knowledge of an adversary during the IO attack investigation. We obtained the minimum values
(NImin, ICAmin, and IOmin) of the std(D −Dp) under each attack type and plotted them in Figure
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9. As shown in the figure, both PABIDOT and DISTPAB provide better attack resistance compared
to RP and GP. We can see a slight increment in the minimum attack resistance of DISTPAB compared
to PABIDOT due to the enhanced randomization as the randomized expansion step is carried out by
each distributed entity separately to improve the randomness of data.
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Figure 9: Attack Resistance. The figure shows the plots of the minimum values (NImin, ICAmin, and IOmin) of the
std(D −Dp) under NI, ICA, and IO attacks. The higher the bar, the better the resistance to attacks.
6. Discussion
This paper proposed an efficient distributed privacy preservation mechanism (named as DISTPAB)
for distributed machine learning. DISTPAB applies randomized n− dimensional geometric transfor-
mations followed by randomized expansion, which is a noise application mechanism that improves the
positiveness and negativeness of input data while improving randomization (used to further improve
the randomization without harming the utility [14]). DISTPAB uses Φ − separation [14] as the un-
derlying privacy model to obtain the optimal perturbation parameters and generate optimal privacy
for the input data. We tested and compared the performance of DISTPAB against PABIDOT, RP,
and GP for the classification accuracy, time complexity, and attack resistance. Additionally, we inves-
tigated the impact of communication delay over distributed perturbation in DISTPAB, and further
analyzed the impact of the number of distributed nodes on the classification during federated machine
learning.
According to our time complexity analysis, DISTPAB introduces a time complexity of O(n4) to
the central entity, where n represents the number of attributes. However, O(n4) = O(k), as n remains
a constant for a given setting. Therefore, the central entity would consume a constant amount of time,
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no matter how many instances (tuples) are introduced. A distributed entity shows a time complexity
of O(n3 ×m) = O(m) as n (the number of attributes) is a constant for a given dataset (m represents
the number of tuples). When we consider a fixed distributed setup, new parameters/sensors are rarely
added at a speed in which the data grows; and more probably it will remain constant. Consequently,
for a given scenario, the amount of time consumed by the central node will grow linearly, which is
optimal for privacy-preserving distributed machine learning.
The empirical evidence on data classification shows that DISTPAB provides similar classification
accuracy to the centralized algorithm and better performance compared to RP and GP. DISTPAB
provides slightly lower classification accuracy compared to the centralized approach as DISTPAB im-
poses an increased level of randomization as the randomized expansion step is carried out by each
distributed entity separately to improve the randomness of data. The empirical evidence (refer to Fig-
ure 8) proved that the number of distributed clients doesn’t have a noticeable impact on classification
accuracy during federated learning (distributed machine learning). However, the amount of time nec-
essary for model convergence increases with the number of clients. This feature makes DISTPAB be
the perfect solution for privacy-preserving federated learning (privacy-preserving distributed machine
learning) where there is a large number of distributed entities involved.
DISTPAB uses Φ − separation [14] as its underlying privacy model, which allows optimal data
perturbation for a given instance. Geometric data transformations and randomized expansion noise
addition followed by random shuffling allow DISTPAB to impose high privacy by reducing the proba-
bility of data reconstruction attacks. Reverse z-score normalization of the final dataset takes the data
back to their original attribute value ranges, making the attackers unable to distinguish the original
data from the perturbed data. This feature reduces the chance of success of an attack trying to recon-
struct the original input data from a perturbed dataset. DISTPAB provides better attack resistance
compared to RP and GP. We can observe that the DISTPAB provides slightly better attack resistance
compared to PABIDOT because DISTPAB adds an increased level of randomization as the randomized
expansion step is carried out by each distributed entity separately to improve the randomness of data.
However, in a federated learning setup, we do not share the perturbed data among the distributed
clients or the server. Consequently, there will not be any data reconstruction attacks on the perturbed
data, and due to the strong notion of privacy of the perturbed data, the privacy of the trained models
will also be high.
In essence, DISTPAB can be an optimal privacy preservation solution for data privacy and machine
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learning that control extensive amounts of data [56], which are deployed in geographically distributed
systems.
7. Conclusions
Many modern systems, such as healthcare and open banking, are often geographically distributed
and constrained with proper mechanisms for privacy-preserving data sharing for analytics. This paper
proposed a distributed perturbation algorithm named DISTPAB that can enforce privacy for dis-
tributed machine learning. In the proposed setup of DISTPAB, a central/coordinating entity controls
the global perturbation parameter generation, whereas the distributed entities can conduct local data
perturbation. The computational complexity of the algorithm that runs in the central entity is O(k)
for the number of instances (k is a constant). The computational complexity of the algorithm, which
runs on a distributed entity, is O(m) for the number of tuples as the number of attributes often re-
mains constant in a given setting where m is the number of instances. Consequently, the operations on
distributed entities have a low computational complexity resulting in excellent efficiency. DISTPAB
provides high classification accuracy, which is close to that of the accuracy of classification performed
with the original data. DISTPAB provides high attack resistance outperforming rotation perturbation
and geometric perturbation. It was also shown that the data produced by DISTPAB is not subjected to
utility degradation, against the number of distributed entities. DISTPAB can be an excellent privacy
preservation algorithm for distributed machine learning.
As future work, we are interested in looking at improving the efficiency of the proposed work for
the number of attributes. To achieve this, we will investigate on the vertical federated learning scheme
where the distributed clients have different feature spaces. Vertical federated learning allows dividing
a particular dataset into partitions by the attributes leaving a specific client to work only on a fewer
number of attributes, which can improve efficiency.
Appendix .1. n-Dimensional translation matrix generation
Equation .1 represents the n-dimensional homogeneous translation matrix TND [51]. The trans-
lational coefficients (ti(n+1), . . . , t(n)(n+1)) are drawn from a uniform random distribution which is
bounded within (0, 1). The uniform random noise is restricted to 0 < ti(n+1) < 1 as the input dataset’s
attribute standard deviations and means become 1 and 0 after the z-score normalization.
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TND =

1 0 0 . . . 0 t1(n+1)
0 1 0 . . . 0 t2(n+1)
0 0 1 . . . 0 t3(n+1)
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 . . . 1 t(n)(n+1)
0 0 0 . . . 0 1

(n+1)×(n+1)
(.1)
Appendix .2. n-Dimensional reflection matrix
Equation .2 shows the homogeneous reflection matrix RFND. Equation .2 represents the reflection
across axis one [51]. The (n+1) axis reflection for the matrix given in Equation .2 can be written as
shown in Equation .3, which provides a low level of bias in the perturbation.
RFND =

1 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
0 −1 0 . . . 0 0 0
0 0 −1 . . . 0 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 . . . −1 0 0
0 0 0 . . . 0 −1 0
0 0 0 . . . 0 0 1

(n+1)×(n+1)
(.2)
Equation .3 represents The (n+1) axis reflection matrix matrix.
RFND =

−1 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
0 1 0 . . . 0 0 0
0 0 1 . . . 0 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 . . . 1 0 0
0 0 0 . . . 0 1 0
0 0 0 . . . 0 0 1

(n+1)×(n+1)
(.3)
Appendix .3. Generating the rotational matrix
Algorithm 4 provides the steps in generating the rotational matrix using the concept of concatenated
subplane rotation. To represent the entire n−dimensional orientation, we use the concept of the con-
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catenated sub-plane rotation. The block matrix given in Equation .4, shows the rotations on the plane
represented by a pair of coordinate axes (xˆi, xˆj) for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n [57]. Thus N(N−1)2 distinct Rij(θij)
should be concatenated in a particular order to generate the composite n-dimensional orthonormal
matrix as represented in Equation .5 with N(N−1)2 degrees of freedom, parameterized by θij . We gen-
erate M , the n-dimensional concatenated subplane rotation matrix for an angle, θi using Algorithm 4
(in Appendix .3) for each θi where ((0 < θi < pi), θi /∈ {pi/6, pi/4, pi/3, pi/2, 2pi/3, 3pi/4, 5pi/6}) [14].
Rij(θij) =

1 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . cosθij 0 . . . 0 −sinθij . . . 0
0 . . . 0 1 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 0 0 . . . 1 0 . . . 0
0 . . . sinθij 0 . . . 0 cosθij . . . 0
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 1

(n+1)×(n+1)
(.4)
M =
∏
i<j
Rij(θij) (.5)
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Algorithm 4: Rotation matrix generation
Input:
n ← number of attributes of the input dataset
θ ← angle of rotation
Output: M ← multidimensional rotation matrix of θ
1 V = {1, 2, 3 . . . n};
2 C = {(i, j)|i, j ∈ V and i 6= j};
3 In = identity matrix of size n ;
4 N =
(
n
2
)
;
5 I3 = In;
6 for k = 1 to N do
7 A = {(ik, ik), (jk, ik), (ik, jk), (jk, jk)} where {ik, jk} is the kthset of C;
8 I2 = In;
9 I2(ik1, jk1) = cos(θ) where, (ik1, jk1) is the set number 1 of A;
10 I2(ik2, jk2) = sin(θ) where, (ik2, jk2) is the set number 2 of A;
11 I2(ik3, jk3) = −sin(θ) where, (ik3, jk3) is the set number 3 of A;
12 I2(ik4, jk4) = cos(θ) where, (ik4, jk4) is the set number 4 of A;
13 I3 = I3× I2
14 M = I3;
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